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Introduction

The struggle between taxpayers and spenders in local
government brings out the best and the worst in us.

It

forces us to .balance our fiscal capacity against our sense
of responsibility for meeting ·the needs of the schools, the
highways, and the town general fund.

It is by no means a

routine or even a very pleasant experience for most voters,
but it is the essential exercise of direct democracy that
still gratefully separates Vermont from the majority of states
in the Union.

Voting on budgets is the fuel that fired the

strongest passions of Vermont municipalities.
We gather together in rooms to decide how much we should
spend, as a community, on services we provide to all residents.
We vote on the purchase of a new grader or a backhoe, on whether
to give money to the Visiting Nurses, on how much the town .
officials should be paid, on the school budget.

We vote these

propositions, knowing that our property taxes will increase or
decrease depending on how we exercise our legal discretion to
set expenditure limits for the town and town school district.
Each year we have a choice.

Each year we have the right to

say yes or no •.
The basis for local taxation in
value of real and personal property.

Ve~ont

is the appraised

Property was once the

principal source of revenue for state and local government,

-ix-
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but in recapt years we have begun to lose confidence in its
ability to support even the needs of towns and school districts,
and we have turned to federal and state income tax sources for
reinforcement.

Still, we must vote to appropriate any monies,

before they may be expended, from whatever source they emanate.
It is the voting at a duly warned town

meeting--th~s

very

populist process we have invented in Vermont--that is the
subject of the following article.
Voting means making choices.

If only one municipality

were involved, we might make these choices with more facility,
but there are two different municipalities, towns and school
districts, with different warnings, different budgets, and
usually different meetings, involved here.

There are also two

different legislative bodies, the selectmen and the school .
board, who are responsible for proposing, defending, and
overseeing the expenditures of these budgets.

One might

even argue that there are two different electorates in many
cases, depending on who turns out at each meeting and who
votes for the two budgets.
The authors have set as the objective of their study
some understanding of the relationship between town and
school district budgets.

They have used statistical

summaries of 243 Vermont towns and school district budgets
for three consecutive years.

They have looked at the results

of budget votes through the cold, dispassionate tube of a
computer and have drawn conclusions from numbers about how
voters make their choices.

-xi-

The provocative question is how discretionary budgets
really are today.

How much freedom do taxpayers have to

decide how much to appropriate each year for local government?
can they afford to ignore state standards on schools and risk
the loss of state aid?

Can they afford to appropriate less

than $50.00 a mile for town highway maintenance and risk the
loss of highway aid?

Can they ignore contract negotiations

with teachers and unionized employees, health and safety codes,
federal regulations on handicapped access, and the prevailing
rate of inflation?
What matters most to selectmen and school directors is
the bottom line.

Sworn to maintain good roads and provide a

suitable education for the children of the municipality, these
worthy officials will not feel they have met their responsibilities if they do not act as strong advocates for sound
budgets designed to fund the services they must provide.
Taxpayers, strapped by tax burdens already heavier than they
can bear, may not share the legislative body's ideas on what
constitutes a sound budget.

So the process of finding an

amount agreeable to both groups often takes on an air of
adversariness that resembles a military encounter.
We have seen the advent of the September budget in school
districts that have failed to adopt a suitable budget in
elections held in every month since March.

~ve

have seen

meetings last until the early hours of the morning before a
budget is voted.

We have seen petitions submitted to remove

-xii-

selectmen and school board members who have offended voters by
conscious deficit spending.

We have seen passion and courage

and subterfuge and disorder at the polls.
This study by authors Tashman and Munson will not cool
those passions or make the passage of suitable budgets in
towns ·a nd school districts any easier, but it is a valuable
contribution to the literature

en Vermont local government.

It confirms my suspicions that discretion in local budget
votes is more myth than reality.

~ve

adopt budgets .according

to the size and income of the population, in relatively uniform
patterns.
Local government in Vermont is a fertile area of
investigation for students and scholars.

The budgetary

process itself holds the ·k ey to the dynamics that drive
communities to new thresholds of voter involvement in
public affairs.

Tashman and Munson have opened the frontier.

Paul S. GiUies
Vermont Deputy
Secretary of State

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SCHOOL TAXES
AND TOWN TAXES IN
VERMONT LOCAL GOVERNMENT

LEONARD J. TASHMAN
MICHAEL J, MUNSON

INTRODUCTION

,·

In Vermont, as in all other states, the voting of
local taxes is a perennial political issue.

Each year

residents of Vermont municipalities vote to approve budgets
for school services as •:Tell as for non-school (i.e., tmvn}
services for the coming fiscal year.

The results of these

votes establish the local school and town tax rates that in
turn determine the tax bill for which each property owner
becomes liable.

~~ile

the bottom line is the total amount

of tax each resident \'Jill be asked to pay, there are interesting questions concerning the vJay in vJhich tax dollars are
divided between the school and non-school functions.
The most basic question is vJhether voter decisions to
commit local taxes for one budget are influenced at all by
the local-tax implications of the other budget.

Alternatively

stated, do voters attempt to achieve a balance between
school-tax and to\om-tax commitments?

In principle there are

three types of behaviors possible:
1.

Independence: School and town budgets are
evaluated entirely on their individual
merits--no relationship exists between the
level of taxes committed to support the school
budget and the level of taxes approved for town
services.,

2.

Competition~
School and town budgets are
evaluated as alternative uses of the local tax
dollar--a trade off (or inverse relationship}
exists betvJeen school and tovm tax commitments:

3.

Complementarity~
School and tax budgets are
evaluated as joint municipal services, to be
funded more or less generously in unison--a
positive (or direct} relationship exists between
school- and tovJn-tax commitments.

-2- .
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The form of voter behavior--independence, competition,
or complementarity--has implications for local government
planning and coordination.

For example, do local officials

increase the risk of voter disapproval of a proposed increment
in the school budget if they recommend substantial increases
in the town budget, as well?

The form of relationship

betvJeen school- and town-tax decisions can also shape a
municipalityvs response to the receipt of state and federal
aid.

Will state aid to education monies, for example, be

utiiized entirely to (a) increase local school expenditure
or (b) reduce local school taxes and indirectly increase
local funding of town services?
In an attempt to determine relationships between school
taxes and town taxes,

"itle

have compiled data for 2 43 of Vermont's

local jurisdictions for three years:
For each locality

'~.-le

l979g 1980, and 1981.

have created three-year averages of

school taxes assessed and of tmvn taxes assessed, with both
measures expressed

on

a per household basis.

Ne then

correlated hm'l7 voter tax commitments to the school and town
budgets relate to the size of the community, the wealth of
the community, and to each other.
Our results, while not always unambiguous, suggest t\tlO
principal
1.

conclusions~

Cownunity wealth and commu~ity size influence
voter choices between the school and to~'l7n
budgets in opposite . directions. Holding
~~ealth constant, larger communities tend to
allocate a greater share of local tax revenue
to the town budget than do smaller communities.
Holding size constant, richer co~nunities tend
to allocate a greater share of local revenues
for the school budget than do poorer communities.

-3-

2.

The dominant form of relationship between
school- and town-tax commitments is complementarity, that is, localities that
allocate above-average levels of taxes to
the school budget also tend to allocate
above-average levels of taxes to the town
budget. There is little or no evidence from
Vermont data that voters view the school and
tm-1n programs as competing uses of the local
tax dollar.

Part 1 presents the arguments that underlie hypotheses of
competition and complementarity in voter choice and reports
some empirical evidence from prior studies.

Part 2 describes

and compares the levels of school- and town-tax assessments
among the 243 Vermont jurisdictions.

Two hypotheses that

emerge from this examination of the Vermont data are analyzed
in parts 3 and 4.

Finally in part 5 we assess the deficiencies

of our analyses and present our plans for further research.

P}~T

I.

1

Competition or Complementarity in
Voter Cho~ces

The hypothesis of competition between school and
claims on the municipal tax base is based upon

t·lrlO

non~s chool

assumptions •

First, it assumes that voters are a1rmre of the tax implications
of their votes on the local budgets.

Such ar.vareness is probably

a plausible assumption in the context of the town meeting tradition in Vermont, especially since the municipal tax base in
Vermont localities is the highly stable and predictable
property base. 2 It is not necessarily a plausible assumption
in states that lack a tradition of local control or in states
that permit localities to levy non-property taxes.

-4-

Second, the hypothesis assumes that there is a limit to
the overall local tax

burd~n

particular fiscal year.

voters are

~lilling

to bear in a

The limit may have a political

origin--a tax rate ceiling, _~or example--or an economic
origin--a fixed proportion of income that voters are willing
to allocate for municipal services.
Under these assumptions, it can be argued that school
and town services must compete for a share of the aggregate
property tax dollar.

If voters find they must commit .relatively

large sums toward uncontrollable expenses in one budget, they
will be reluctant to support discretionary outlays
other budget.

~Tithin

the

The necessity to authorize a substantial in-

crease in tax revenues for road maintenance, for example, may
impinge on voter willingness to endorse any increment in school
taxes during the same year.
In her 1975 article in the National Tax Journal, Helen Ladd
offers a similar statement of the competition hypothesis.
Potentially, the provision of non-educational
public services specifically to business firms could
induce a reduction in residents' demand for education services. This is based on the view that the
public provision of business reduces the income
available to residents to be spent on all 3other goods
and services, including public education.
Ladd found "no evidence to support the hypothesis of a negative
impact on education expenditures of high non-school expenditures"
. -4

from her data analyses.
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Nor did a study by Seymour Sacks, et al., find any evidence
of competition between school and non- school claims on the
municipal tax base.

Results based on a national cross-section

of ninety-five central cities led Sacks to conclude that
"cities that have high (per capita) taxes in one domain also
have high taxes in the other ... s
Both the Ladd and Sacks studies suggest that any interdependence beb.veen the school and tmvn budget levels is
probably

11

1'."1eak" and reflects not competition but complementarity

(Sacks used the term "reinforcement") in voter choice.
A c:::>mplementari ty hypothesis can be asserted on t\'110 distinct
grounds.

First, the residents of a municipality may have "voted

by foot" for a community in -v1hich individuals have tastes for a

mix of public and private goods similar to their own.

Such

homogeneous collections of voters may prefer high levels of
public services (and taxes) in both domains of the municipal
budget.

This is to say that good schools, as v!ell as good

roads and recreational facilities, may well be complementary
demands.
In addition,

commlli~ity

zoning and subdivision regulations

may be promulgated to achieve a balance between residential
property and commercial/industrial development.

Voters may

believe that expansion of the community's commercial/industrial
base will reduce or at least slow the rate of increase in
required school tax rates.

If so, their allocation of tax

revenues to the town budget may be viewed as a vote toward

-6-

improvement of the community's infrastructure and, in turn, an
investment toward attraction of neti commerce and industry.
Hence, higher town-tax levies during a fiscal year may be
voted precisely because the school tax levy is high.
In summary, the relationship between school and town
claims on the municipal revenue base can be driven both by
competitive and by complementary forces.

It is conceivable

that the empirical findings of little or no correlation between
school and town taxes reflect the net result or cancellation
of competitive and complementary thrusts.

The findings also

are consistent with a hypothesis of independence in voter
choices between school and town taxes.

Still another explanation,

however, emerges from our review of the Vermont data in the
next section.

PART II.

School and Town Revenues in Vermont
Commun~t~es ~
Background Analys~s

Prerequisite to an . analysis of relationships between school
and town revenues are several basic questions about the behavior
of Vermont communities.
information

In this section \ve tv-ill report ne\"J

about~

1.

Local (property) tax revenues assessed in support
of the school budget.

2.

Local (property) tax revenues assessed in support
of the town tudget.

3.

The relative shares of school . and town tax revenues.

-7-

Annual data on local taxes by tm,m are published in the
Annual Report of the Vermont Division of Property Valuation
and Revie'I.V' (DPVR) •

These data show taxes assessed for schools

as well as total local taxes assessed.

Hence, taxes assessed

for the town budget can be derived by subtracting the school
component from the total.

At the time of this study, the

latest available year of data was 1981.
Utilizing the DPVR annual figures, we have compiled a
three-year average

(1979-1981) of each community's school

ta:x: and tm•m tax assessments.

Any single year's data will

reflect the many special circumstances that influence a
community's budgetary decisions during a particular fiscal
year.

A three-year average "smooths '; the annual data and,

accordingly, should be more indicative of the community's underlying preferences for municipal services.
J!ll oreover u in order to make meaningful inter-community
comparisons, the data measuring total dollars of taxes assessed
must be expressed on a per-unit basis, ti1at is, they must be
scaled for differences in community size.

To accomplish tl1is,

ta:x: dollars can be expressed on a per-capita basis (Sacks), on
a per-pupil basis (Ladd) or upon a per-household basis.
have chosen the last-named.
involves three key actors :

~'Ve

The behavior we are investigating
decision-making units (voters),

paying units (property taxpayers), and consuming units (families).
The best composite of the three is the household.

-8-

The best available data for the number of households in
a community is the number of d\tlelling units ( 19 80 census) •
Accordingly, we describe the behavior of Vermont communities
on the basis of the three variables:
S:

School taxes assessed per household, 1979-1981
average

T~

To'lfm taxes assessed per household, 1979-1981
average

P:

The school share (proportiog> of total local taxes
assessed, 1979-1981 average

We were able to determine values for S, T, and P for 243
of Vermont's 251 taxing jurisdictions.

Eight communities were

omitted due to missing data in the DPVR Annual Reports.

7

We

now present a description of these results.
Char·t 1 is a frequency distribution of variable S, the
three-year average of school taxes assessed per household.
Sho-vm are the number and percentage of communities \t-Jithin
each

it

class interval."

The first class interval v for example,

represents communities in t;Jhich the level of school taxes
lies between $100 and $200 per household.
The median level of S is $560 and the (unweighted) mean
is $613.

So the "average" Vermont community is assessing
about $600 a year in school taxes per household. 8 The middle
50 percent of the communities--when arranged in order of

s--

raises between $400 and $800 per household, an interval that
can be vie't'l7ed as defining a

11

norrnal 11 range of school taxation.

Chart 1 also reveals that there is considerable variation
about the norm.

Annual average school taxes per household

9

CHART l
... . .
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are as low as $132 (in tJinhall) and as high as $1,896 (Essex
.

Junct~on

)

•9

Chart 2 provides the frequency distribution of the
variable T, the three-year average of town taxes assessed
per household.

The median T is $230, the mean is $253, and

normal range is $170 to $290 per household.

Hence, Vermont

communities tend to assess almost $2.50 of revenue for the
school budget for each $1.00 assessment for town services
(Hedian S

=

$560, r'ledian T

=

Across the state, T ranged

$230).

from a low of $26 (Bloomfield) to a high of $686 (Brattleboro} .
Information on the school share of total local revenues
(P) is shown in chart 3.
to 0.71.

Both the mean and median are equal

So, on the average, 71 percent of local property

taxes were assessed for the school budget, 29 percent for town
services.

In the vast majority of

co~~unities,

share fell between 60 and 80 percent.

the school

Richford was at the

bottom of this distribution with a school share of 35 percent
and Bloomfield was at the top ,.7ith a school share of 95 percent.
In table 1 we report simple (pain1ise) correlation
coefficients

~~ong

the four variables S, T, P , and H, where

H denotes the number of households in a community (i.e.,
community size) •

vJe call your attention to bro of these

correlation coefficients.
The correlation between S and T,

r(S, T) , is +0. 46 4, \'lhicll

is a statistically significant but only moderately positive
corre 1 a t

.

~on.

10

Th'Ll';

corre ~at-. ion cuggcst-s that. in tho::;o Vermont

ll

Cll Aln' 2

FREQUE NCY DISTRIBUTION OF VERMONT TOWNS
BY LEVEL OF TOWN TAXES ASSESSED PER HOUSEHOLD (T)
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units and median hou se hold inc ome are from th e 1980
Census; the multiy ea r ave rages , rati os , and statistics were compiled by the author s .
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CH Al{'l' 3

FREQUENCY DISTRIBliTION OF VERMONT TOHNS
BY THE SCHOOL SHARE OF TOTAL LOCAL REVENUES (P)
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TABLE 1

CORRELATION MKfRIX
(N

= 243 t own s)

,.,

s =

school taxes assessed per hous e hold

T

Town taxes assessed ·per household

P

School share of total local rev e nues

H

Number of households

; ·.

'· . .

. '!

;

'.

I.

. ' '.

~

J .

~

. ·u
.

.

~.

'·

s

T

'·.

:•"'.

0.151

'. :

,.

0.464 *

0. 417

T
; ·:

~

..

..

.-..

,~, ;··.

'·

p.

-0. 2·44 *

0.364

-0.591

-,
*Statistic,a lly significant
'

ources : · Annual tax x;-evenue and property valuation dat a rare · from Annual Report s (1980- 82 )
of the Di~isi 'on · of Property Valuation and Review (DPVR), Agency of Administration,
State o~ Vermont;. housing units and median hous e hold income are from the 1980
Census; the mul dyear: ·.iverages, ·. ratios, and stat is ti c s were compiled by the
authors.

tm.-Jns where school taxes per dvJelling are above average, tmm
taxes per dwelling also tend to be abova average.

On the

surface, this result supports a hypothesis of complementarity
in voter preference for municipal services and is consistent
with Sacks's findings in his analysis of ninety-five central
cities across the country.
The correlation between P and H, r(P,H), is -0.244, a
lm:l but statistically significant negative correlation.

The

result suggests a tendency for the school share of local
revenues (P) to decline--and hence, the town share to
increase--as community size increases.

This finding is

provocative.
Perhaps

L~e

relationship (form of interdependence) between

school and town tax revenues differs between smaller and
larger communities.

Neither the Ladd nor the Sacks study

incorpora·ted community size as an explanatory variable, both
assuming (implicitly) that correlations between S and T will
not be affected by coll\ffiuni ty size.

It is possible, therefore,

ti1at an analysis which explicitly distinguishes size-classes
of communities may reveal information about the rela·tionship
betvJeen S and T that would be "blurred" by correlations calculated for the aggregate of all communitiesv small and large.
Evidence to this effect comes from a recent study by one
of the authors based on the eighteen towns in Chittenden
County, Vermont.

11

Munson detected that the larger towns

tended at once to have the highest town services budget (per
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household) and the lowest school budget (per household) .

He

speculated that this result reflected the effect of community
size on the kinds of tm·m services provided.

For example,

Burlington, the larges'c cormnunity in the stuc1y, provides its
residents and businesses with a relatively full array of
services, including police and fire protection, parks and
recreation, sanitation and sewage 1 and road maintenance
(street repair and snm1 removal) .

Bolton, the second smallest

corrununity in the county, devotes most of its tovm budget to
but one

function~

road maintenance.

Recent data for Chittenden County are swnmarized in
table 2. *

The tmvns are listed from smallest to largest based

on the number of housing units in 1980.

The column labeled

"Road Haintenance %11 is the percentage of each CO!Th.llunity us
to~m-service
~·Jhat

budget devoted to non-school expenditures .

we find is thatg in the smaller communities (feHer than

1,500 housing units)

1

road maintenance absorbs a r.najority of

the tm'ITn budget (52-66 percent)

~1hile

in the larger commw1ities

(more than 1,500 housing units), road maintenance is allocated
a minority ( lJ- 42 percent) of the tmm budget.

At least in

Chittenden County, growth in size induces a broadening of the
array of tm"ln services provided.
*Under 1.deal cond1.t1.ons these data ~Jould describe expenditures
for all Vermont municipalities. Unfortunately, the only source
of expenditure data is individual town reports, and these do
not follow a uniform format. The only tabulated expenditure
data \·J ere those prepared by the Chittenden County Regional
Planning Commission.
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TABLE ··2
Percentage of 1981 Non-School Expenditures Allocated to Road
Maintenance in Chittenden County
(Municipalities arrayed by number of housing units in 1980)
(N = 18)
Housing Units
St. George
Bolton
Huntingtcn
~vest ford
Underhill
Hinesburg
Charlotte
Richmond
Jericho
Williston
Shelburne
Essex Town
Milton
Winooski
Essex Jet.
s. Burlington
Colchester
Burlington
1

2

241
359
448
468
751
1.,025
1,043
1,071
1,078
1,204
1, 719
2,279
2,321
2,403
2,547
3,972
4,566
13,767

Road Maintenance %
15.8 1
64.9
63.5
53.6
52.5
58.1
66.92
60.3
60.6
57.6
24.5
24.7
41.7
18.8
33.4
19.4
21.13
19 7
0

St. George has 5. 65 miles of public roads and no public buildings.
Richmond data are for 1980.

3
Expenditures on solid waste disposal are included in street
department expenditures.
Source:

Data taken from 11 Economic and Miscellaneous Data Report:
1982, 11 Chittenden County Regional Planning Commission.
Compiled as part of the commission's ongoing study of
local municipal finances by Michael J. Munson in 1983.
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Road maintenance is a distinctive cat.egory i n the to·•n
budget.

In any fiscal year there is a minimum level that

must be expended, whi ch depends upon 1>Jeather and street conditions.

Hothing generates citizen complaints faster than

unplowed or impassable roads.

But beyond the level required

for adequate conveyance of vehicles, there is little incremental benefit to additional road maintenance expenditures.
Munson

describes the road E1a.intenan c e function, therefore ,

as c:. relatively
~Ja rison

non -discretionar~

h u clget cor.ll>onent .

In

COI;1-

to most other typ es of tmvn service s, re q uired outlays

for roaQ. maintenance arc p rescribcu by concH tions external to
t he local econcmy; h ence, the road l.Uaintenance !Judget should
~e

r e lat.ively insensitive to budgetarlr rc q uir2ments for

otl1~ r

tmm se rvic:=s.
'l'his

argu~nent

p rovi des a p otential e xp lv.nation for t ile

evidence that P, the

sc~1ool

s hare of

locE~.l

tax

revenues ~

te:q ds ·t o decline as H v conu.nuni-t:y s i ze? increases.
in size as

~o Je

\lith grouth

proceed from smaller to larger , coanuni ties

·tend to com:.::1it increasing amounts of tax r e venue tmJarcl a
:.:;roadening of the set of

to~·m

s ervices offered., in a ddition

to maintaining their relatively non - discretionary supp ort f or
rou.cl Itlaintenance.

Thus, tax rev0 nues for tmvn services \!Jill

rise as community si ze expancls.

Since sch ool r e venues pe r

12
.
b ear 1'J.tt 1 e or no re 1 at1.onsn1.n
.
, .
.
d::Je 11 1.n0
to comrnunl.. t y s1.ze
,

tll.. :: e ffec ·t of grmJth in s ize (other thing s b eing equal) is
co r educe the school share of local revenu8s.
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PART III.

The Effects of Size and tJealth

The correlation evidence presented in part 2 affords at
best an impression of the relationship between community size
and local tax choices.

A more formal investigation of these

relationships would require that other determinants of local
tax choices be held constant.

For example, voter choices

between school and town services may be influenced by variables
such as (1) the number of public school children per household,
(2) housing density (number of households per square mile
of land area), (3) the mix of property valuation between
residential and "business" property, and (4) the wealth of the
municipal voters.

Of these, the last--comunity wealth--is

certainly the most critical factor.

In an affluent community,

voters can finance both good schools and good municipal
services at reasonable tax rates; a poor community, in
contrast, cannot acquire much of either, except at burdensome
tax rates.
Positive relationships between local school spending and
local wealth have been documented by numerous studies covering
virtually every state in the nation.
the intent of both federal

a~d

In fact, it has been

state court decisions to

mitigate, if not eliminate, the '\Ileal th dependence of the
financing of education in local communities.
In Vermont, as well as in other states which employ an
"equalizing formula" for distribution of state and local
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school districtsr there is an additional reason to expect a
positive (direct) relationship between school taxes and wealth.
Not only does school expenditure tend to increase with
wealth, but since state aid is distributed in inverse relation
to wealth, the local tax share of school spending increases
as wealth increases.

Alternatively stated, the wealthier

the community, the larger the share of each dollar of the
school budget that must be financed from local revenues.
Hence, it is reasonable to posit that local school-tax
decisions are closely wealth-dependent {correlated with
community-wealth) while local town-tax decisions are less
wealth-dependent than they are size-dependent (correlated
with community-size).

More technically, we offer the

following pair of hypotheses:
Hypothesis (la) ~ If community size is held constant
(i.e., if all communities had the same number of
households) , then school tax revenues 'l.vill tend to
increase as community ,.,.,eal th increases, both
absolutely and as a proportion of total local
revenues. In symbolic terms, as wealth {W) grmvs,
holding size (H) constant, both S (school taxes)
and P (school share of total local revenues) will
increase.
Hypothesis (lb): If community wealth is held constant,
tax revenues assessed for town services will tend to
increase as community size-rllereases, both absolutely
and as a proportion of total local revenues.
Symbolically, asH (size) increases, holding W
(wealth) constant, T {town taxes) will rise and P
(school share of total local revenues) will fall.
Several different statistical methods can be used to
test the validity of our hypotheses, including multiple
regression and multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) •

The
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approach we have taken hereu while lacking the elegance of
the multivariate techniques, is far simpler to understand .
and provides, as it turns out, qualitatively similar results.
We begin with measurements of the size and wealth of
each community.

Community-size, as previously noted, is

measured by the number of households in a locality (1980
Census) and denoted by H.
Our measurement of community-wealth

is designed to

( vJ)

incorporate both the income and property components of the
wealth of community households.

For the income component ,

we use Median Household Income (1980 Census).

The property

component is derived from the 1980 equalized fair market
value of residential property in a community (DPVR 1981
Annual Report).

Following a procedure by McMahon,

13

we

converted the property valuation data for each community into
a flow of "property income."

In essence , property income

represents the annual interest income that can be derived
by investing the equity value of residential property at
current interest rates.
Our community-wealth variable is the sum of median household income (1980) and "property income

11

per household (1980) .

It can be interpreted as a community's average income from
e arnings , transfer payments, and property.
The next step involved the

grouping~

communities into size and wealth brackets .
brackets were defined:

of individual
Four community-size

fewer than 400 households, 400-799

-21-

households, 800-1,999 households, and 2,000 or more households.

Like'l.·lise, four community-wealth brackets were created:

less than $13,500; $13,500-$15,999; $16,000-$18,499; and
$18,500 and over.

Within each community-size bracket, we determined the
correlation coefficient bet\'7een community-wealth (W) and each
of our three behavioral variables:

S (school taxes), T

(town taxes) , and P (school share of total local revenues) •
These correlations, reported in table 4 (see p. 23) , show the
relationship between tax behaviors and wealth, holding
.t

commun~

.
y-s1ze
constant. 14

In addition, within each community-wealth bracket, we
calculated the correlation coefficients between community-size
(H) and each of S, T, and P.

These correlations, reported in

table 4, relate .taxing behavior and community-size, with
community-wealth held constant.
The results reported in tables 3 and 4 enable us to
assess hypotheses (la) and {lb).
Hypothesis (la): If community size is held constant
(i.e., if all communities had the same number of
households) , then school tax revenues \-Jill tend to
increase as community wealth increases, both absolutely
and as a proportion of total local revenues. In
symbolic terms, as wealth (W) grows, holding size (H)
constant, both S (school taxes) and P (school share
of local revenues) will increase.
If (la) is sound, then we should expect that within
each community-size bracket in table 3 there is:
1.

A positive correlation between W and s--suggesting
that, as wealth increases, school tax revenues
per household tend to increase as well.
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TABLE 3
Correlations with Community Wealth
Correlation Coeff.
between
Community-Size Brackets (No. of
Community vleal th (W)
Households)
and:
Less than
400
400-799
800-1999
2000 and o1
(r.=74)

(n=84)

(n=64)

(n=21)

School Taxes

(S)

0.427

0.374

0.722

0. 817

Town Taxes

(T)

0.253

0. 301

0.307

0.194

School Share

(P)

0.054

0.083

0.241

0. 800

Lowest r that is
significantly
different from
zero at Cl. = 0. 10

0.195

0.183

0.211

r.east significant
difference between
r(W,S) and r(W,T)
at~= 0.10

0.277

0.255

0.299

Sources:

0. 549

Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are from
Annual Reports (1980-82) of the Division of Property
Valuation and Review (DPVR), Agency of Administration,
State of Vermont; housing units and median household
income are from the 1980 Census; the multiyear
averages, ratios, and statistics were compiled by
the authors.
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. TABLE 4

Correlations with Community Size
correlation Coeff.
between
community Size (H)
Less than
and=
$13,500
(n=42)

Community-Wealth Bracket
$18,500 and
over

$13,500$15,999

$16,000$18,500

(n=81)

(n=68)

(n=52)

School Taxes

(S)

-0.050

-0.02 3

0.096

0.326

Town Taxes

(T)

0.104

0 . 467

0.394

0.430

School Share

(P)

-0.137

-0.406

- 0.216

-0.198

0.257

0.183

0.211

0.231

0.374

0.264

0.290

0.333

Lowest r that
i s significantly
different from
ze r o at().,= 0.10
Lea st significant
difference between
r(H,S) and r(H,T)
atO.. = 0.10

Sources:

Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are
from Annual Reports (1980-82) of the Division of
Property Valuation and Review (DPVR) , Agency of
Administration, State of Vermont; housing units and
median household income are from the 1980 Census;
the multiyear averages, ratios, and statistics were
compiled by the authors.
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2.

A positive correlation beb;·J een ~·l and P--signifying
that, as wealth increases, the school proportion
of local tax revenues tends to increase as well.

3.

A higher (more positive) correlation between W
and S than between ~v and T--implying that school
tax revenues are more closely related to communitywealth than are town tax revenues.

Precisely these results, however, are found in only one
of the four community-size brackets--2,000 households or more.
Here the correlation coefficients r(vJ,S) and r(W,P) are quite
high (0. 817 and 0.800, respectively) and readily exceed the
minimum correlation required for statistical significance at
the 10-percent level (shown as 0.378 in the last column, the
next to the bottom row).

Although Sis far more highly

correlated with w than T is (0.817 vs. 0.194), it barely
exceeds the 0.549 minimum difference for statistical significance at the 10-percent level.
Had this configuration of correlations emerged right
across the community-size brackets, we would have dramatic
confirmation of hypothesis (la).
hm:1ever, are observably weaker:

The remaining results,
while

~qe

do find significantly

positive correlations between WandS, the correlations
between W and P are not significantly above zero.
Finally, we can observe that r(vJ ,S) is higher than r(W ,T)
in all four community-size brackets--the difference between
r (W ,S) and r (W ,T) being statistically significant at d...= .10 in
the two largest size-brackets.

Thus, there is moderate

empirical support for the belief that school tax levels are
significantly more wealth-related than are town tax levels.
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Hypothesis (lb): If community wealth is held constant ,
tax revenuesassessed for tmm services will tend to
increase as community size increases , both absolutely
and as a proportion of total local revenues.
Symbolically, as H (size) increases, holding W
(wealth) constant, T (tmm taxes) will rise and P
(school share of total local revenues) will fall.
If hypothesis (lb) is sound, then the coefficients in
table 4 should

reveal ~

1.

Positive correlations between T and H.

2.

Negative correlations between H and P--because, as
H increases, the town proportion of local revenues
is expected to rise; hence, the school proportion
(P) will falL

3.

Correlations for H and T that are higher than the
analogous correlations for H and S.

The results for each of the middle two wealth-brackets
provide statistically significant support for hypothesis (lb)
in all three respects.

T is positively correlated '"ith H, P

is negatively correlated with H, and r(H,T) is significantly
higher than r(H,S).
In the \'lealthiest communities (the last column), the
correlations all have the hypothesized sign, but the only
statistically significant result is the positive correlation
for Hand T (0.430).

The correlation for Hand Pis too low

for significance even atCl=.lO, and r(H,T) does not exceed
r(H,S) by a statistically significant amount,.
the \veal th-bracket representing the

poorest~

Finally, in

town, nothing

but "noise" (insignificant correlations) emerges.
Overall, we consider the evidence from tables 3 and 4
to be qualitatively supportive of hypothesis (1) , although the
observed pattern of generally weak correlations is not conclusiv2.
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Much more satisfactory is the evidence displayed in
table 5, for the twenty-one communities containing at least
2,000 households.

These twenty-one communities, with a total

of 82,587 households in 1980, accounted for 37 percent of all
Vermont households that year.
In table 5, the communities are listed in increasing
order of community-wealth, from the poorest--st. Albans--to

1

the wealthiest "urban" community--Essex Junction.

3

Among this

group, Swanton is the median in terms of community-wealth:
therefore, we may refer to the ten towns following Swanton
as the

11

relatively wealthy 11 corr.munities and the ten towns

preceding Swanton as the "relatively poor 11 communities.
Since we have isolated the "large 11 communi ties--those
that can be expected to provide the fullest array of town
services--we would expect that wealth differences should be
associated principally with differences in school tax levels
rather than town tax levels (hypothesis [la]).

In turn,

the school proportion of total local revenues (P) should be
higher for the relatively wealthy (large) communities than
for the relatively poor

(~arge)

communities.

Support for this hypothesis from table 5 is overwhelming.
1.

Among the ten relatively poor towns, the school
share (P) varies from 49.9 to 65.2 percent with
a median of 56 percent. In seven of these ten
communities, P is below 60 percent. Among the
relatively wealthy towns, the .school share lies
within the range, 60.8-84.7 percent, with a
median of 68.5 percent.

2

4
5
6

7
8
9
1
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TABLE 5

Comparisons bet\'leen Weal thy and Poor Urban Communities
Community
(Listed from low
to high in terms

Town Taxes
MEDIANS
T

School Share

School Taxes

58.0%
54.6
55.1
65.2
56.8
52.3
52.1
64.0
64.7
49.9

$453
394
517
456
572
669
747
562
628
499

$329
328
421
244
435
609
686
316
342
500

72.8

498

186

60.8
68.9
61.2
61.0
71.0
62.6
74.1
68.1
73.9
84.2

719
877
785
860
606
680
637
1173
1361
1869

463
397
499
549
247
405
223
567
482
349

p

s

of community-wealth)
1. St. Albans
2. BRrre City
3. · Ne.r1port

4. WinoosRi

5'

6.

7'
8.
9.
10 .

Eurlington
Rockingham
Brattleboro
St. Johnsbury
Bennington
Rutl and

(M
edian:

Swanton)

11 . Hontpelier
12 . Middlebury
13 . Hartford
14. Springfield
15 . ~iilton
16. Barre Town

17. Colchester
18. Essex Town
19. South Burlington
20. Essex Junction

Sourc8s:

p

s

=

56.0~

= $540
T = $382

p =

s =
T =

Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are from
Annual Reports (1980-£2) of the Division of Property
Valuation and Review (DPVR), Agency of Administration,
State of Vermont; housing units and median household
income are from the 1980 Census, the multiyear averages,
ratios, and statistics were compiled by the authors.

68.5%
$823
$4J4
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2.

Town tax levels (T} do not differ very much
between the relatively poor and the relatively
tvealthy communi ties. As shown in table 6 (see
p. 30}, the median T is $382 i~ the ten
relatively poor towns, $434 in the ten
relatively wealthy towns, a difference of less
than 15 percent. In con~rast, the medianS
($823} in the relatively wealthy towns is
52 percent higher than the median S ($540} in
the relatively poor tO't'l7ns.

PART IV. Correlations between School and Town Taxes
The analysis of the preceding section concerned the
effects of community size and community wealth on the. levels
and mix of school and town tax revenues.

On balance, the

results suggested the importance of community size as a
factor influencing the taxing behaviors.

In this section,

we extend our previous results to investigate the form of
r e lntionship between school and town tax levels and whether the
form of relationship differs as a function of community size .
Hypothesis ~: The form of relationship between school
tax revenues per household (S) and town tax revenues
per household (T) will change as community size increases. Competition in voter choices is more likely
to emerge among small communities than among large
communities. Conversely, complementarity in voter
choices has a higher probability of being detected
within a class of large communities than within a
class of small communities.
The rationale for the second hypothesis requires a bit
of additional explanation.

As discussed previously, in the

smaller communities in Chittenden County (table 2} town taxes
are allocated largely for road maintenance, a relatively
non-discretionary function.

In those small jurisdictions

that face a requirement to levy high tax rates for road
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maintenance, voters can limit their total tax liability only
by exercising discretion upon (i.e., restricting) the size
of the school budget.
In larger communities, voter choices must encompass a
broader array of tmvn services in addition to public schooling.
Hence, the necessity of high tax assessment for road maintenance
may lead voters to fund other, more discretionary town services
at a lower level.

Competition then may be diffused among the

components of the town budget and not manifest itself in the
choice between tmvn and school services.
Of course, differences in community size alone cannot
be expected to explain all differences in voter preferences
between school and to\'m services.

The demographic composition

of a community's voters as well as the locality's zoning and
subdivision policies will affect the types of services demanded.
Prope~ly

controlling for these factors is difficult, if not

impossible, to do statistically.
2 recognizes this difficulty :

Our expression of hypothesis

It asserts implicitly that,

abcve and beyond these other considerations, an increase in
community size accentuates a tendency toward complementarity
in voter choices, and conversely, a decrease in community size
reinforces a tendency tmvard competition in voter choices.
Shown in table 6 are correlations between S (school taxes)
and T (town taxes) for each

cc~unity-size

bracket.

Un-

qualified support for hypothesis 2 would require that the
de gree of correlation between S and T becomes increasingly
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TABLE 6

Correlation Coefficients for School Taxes (S) and Town Taxes (T)
Community-Size
Bracket

Simple

Correlation~

r(S,T)

Wealth-Adjusted Correlatio
r(S,T/W)

(Number of Households)
(400 (n=74)

0. 2 42*

400-799 (n=84)

0.420*

0.348*

800~1999

0.376*

0.234*

0.549*

0.690*

(n=64)

2000 or more (n=21)
*Significantly different from

Sources:

zero~=

0.10

Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are from
Annual Reports (1980-82) of the Division of Property
Valuation and Review (DPVR) v Agency of Administration,
State of Vermont: housing units and roedian household
income are from the 1980 Census; the multiyear averages,
ratios; and statistics were compiled by the authors.
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positive (or decreasingly negative) as \>Je proceed from the
smallest to the largest cormnunities . .
Note that in each size-bracket we show a pair of
correlation coefficients:

a simple correlation coefficient,

r(S,T) and a v;ealth-adjusted correlation coefficient, r(S,T/W).
The latter is offered as added precaution that the comparisons
across size-brackets are not confounded by differences in
wealth.
The patterns revealed by the simple and partial correlatious
are quite similar.

First, we observe that all correlation

coefficients are positive.

This result indicates that in

general voters seem to express complementary demands for
school and town services.

Witi1in any community size-bracket

in Vermcnt, towns that vote higher school taxes per household
also tend to vote higher town taxes per household.

While

these results are qualitatively similar to the findings of
Sacks, they provide somewhat stronger affirmation of complementarity in voter choice.

Sacks ' s data represent a single

fiscal year, \vhereas our data are a composite of three
consecutive years.

Sacks's data are aggregated over all

community-sizes; ours are disaggregated by community-size
brackets.
We also can see from table 6 that r(S,T) appears to be
substantially higher for communities with at least 2,000
households than it is within the smaller size-brackets.
Descriptively, this result is supportive of hypothesis 2,
suggesting a stronger degree of complementarity in voter
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choice within large communities than that which prevails
within smaller communities.

However, a statistical test

of the differences in r(S,T) across size brackets shows that
overall the differences are not statistically significant
(Chi-Square, 0..= 0.10).

Thus we cannot reject the null

hypothesis that the form of relationship between S and T is
independent of community-size: the greater degree of complementarity observed for the largest communities could be
due to chance •
PART V.

Qualifications and Extensions

When the data fail to offer substantive and statistically
significant support for a hypothesis, there are two types
of possible explanations.

First, the hypothesis itself may

be overly simplistic or simply unsound.
be inadequate for the test.

Second, the data may

In principle, before one

dismisses the hypothesis, one should investigate possible
deficiencies of the data base and research design.

In this

regard, the analyses we have reported scffer from at least
two substantive shortcomings.
First, our local-tax variables are too highly aggregated,
distinguishing school taxes only from the aggregate of town
taxes.

Our hypotheses rest partly on the belief that the

road maintenance component of town taxes is a relatively
non-discretionary (wealth-insensitive) commitment.
proper tests of the

Accordingly,

hypotheses require a further disaggregation

of local town taxes between road maintenance and other
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functions.

While such an effort is in progress, it appears

that only a minority of the Vermont communities report their
annual tax assessments for road maintenance (to the DPVR) in
a distinct line item.

So data collection in this pursuit

will be a challenging task.
Second and as noted earlier, community size and community
wealth are not the only variables that are relevant to an
explanation of tax choices.

In our further investigations,

we \-lill incorporate data measuring the number of pupils per
household in a community, the density of housing in a
community, and the mix of property between residential and
"business."

Between-community variation in these variables

should be statistically controlled when assessing the
effects of differences in community size and wealth.

Doing

so will not necessarily lead to stronger support for our
hypotheses; however, it will serve to diminish the risk that
our analytical results are being confounded by the behavior
of these factors.

NOTES
1.
A data · appendix providing individual-town figures on the
measures created for tl1e study is available from the authors
on request.

2.
At town meeting time voters often are told the official
estimate of the grand list for the upcoming fiscal year as
well as estimates of federal and state funding for local
programs. Hence, adoption of a local budget proposal is
tantamount to approval of the property tax rate that will
have to be assE:ssed. l\loreover, since each property o~mer is
cognizant of the assessed (or · listed) value of his or her
property, a tax rate can be translated readily into an
estimate of the property owner's tax liability.

3.
Helen F. Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal
Capacity, and the Composition of the Property Tax Base,"
National Tax Journal 28, no. 2 (June 1975) :152.
4.

Ibid.

5.
Seymour Sacks et al., "Competition between Local School
and i.~on-school Functions for the Property Tax Base," in Property
Taxation and the Finance of Education, ed. Richard W. Lindholm
(Un~versity of W~sconsin Press, 1974), 176.
6.

For each P

= S s+

T

a~d

the three-year average is:

(Pl979 + pl980 + pl981) 1 3 •
7.
The Annual Reports contain numerous omissions as well as
occasionally erroneous figures. We corrected errors for
approximately twenty jurisdictions, after consultation with
town clerks.
8.
The figure does not mean that the 11 average" household in
a community is liable for $600 a year in school taxes. A
portion of the taxes assessed in any community is paid by
business establishments, open-land owners, and vacation homeowners. We assume, however, that the "burden 11 of taxes
assessed on all property, residential and other, is borne
by the resident households. Support for this assumption is
provided by Michael c. Lovell whose examination of Connecticut
school districts suggests 11 that voters feel they carry much
of the burden of the (property) tax on business property"
(!;Spending for Education: The Exercise of Public Choice, 11
Review of Economics and Statistics 60 [November 1978]:91).
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9.
Actual school expenditures per household are approximately
40 percent higher on average and are less widely disparate
than are school tax revenues per household. The excess of
expenditure over local revenue reflects state and federal aid
to local school districts. State aid (under the Miller
Formula--in effect through FY1982) in general supplemented
the revenues of the low-taxing towns to a greater extent than
it supplemented the revenues of the high-taxing towns.
10. Note that a correlation coefficient between any two
variables must assume a value between -1.0 (perfect negative
correlation) and +1.0 (perfect positive correlation). The
value 0.0 indicates no (linear) correlation at all. Values
above (approximately) 0.120 are significantly different from
zero at the 1 percent level of significance (George W. Snedecor
and William G. Cockran, Statistical Hethods, 7th ed. [Ames:
Iowa State University Press, 1980], table a-ll, p. 477).
11. Michael J. lVlunson, "Residential Property Tax Burden in
Chittenden County" (Mimeo, December 19 81) •
12. From table 1, the correlation r(S,H) = 0.151, which is
not significantly different from zero, while r(T,H) = 0.417
which is significantly above zero.
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